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Abstract 
Are sell-side analysts reluctant to go against the investment views of their hedge fund clients? We 
show that analysts tend to upgrade stocks recently bought and downgrade stocks recently sold by 
hedge funds. Relative to other buy and strong buy recommendations, similar recommendations on 
stocks predominantly held by hedge funds parlay into poorer three-month and six-month stock 
returns. Hedge funds concurrently offload their stock holdings when analysts issue flattering reports. 
In line with an agency based explanation, our results are more pronounced for important brokerage 
clients such as high dollar turnover hedge funds and hedge funds who are prime brokerage clients of 
the analyst’s investment bank. 
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1. Introduction 
“Wall Street research departments are rapidly organizing themselves to serve their best 
paying customers: hedge funds” 
-Institutional Investor Magazine, 14 October 2003 
 
In a post-Spitzer era, Wall Street research departments can no longer partake in the 
revenues from investment banking. Instead, anecdotal evidence suggests that sell-side 
analysts now cater increasingly to hedge funds which trade frequently and can therefore 
generate the brokerage commissions needed to sustain research.1 Moreover, hedge funds also 
pay significant fees to investment banks for prime brokerage services such as financing and 
securities lending. Market observers have raised concerns that analysts are often reluctant to 
issue reports that go against the investment views of important clients such as hedge funds 
and other institutional investors (Unger, 2001). Indeed, some analysts admit that hedge funds 
twist their arms to write reports in a certain way.2 Prominent hedge funds, such as Steven 
Cohen’s SAC Capital Advisors, James Chanos’ Kynikos Associates, and Daniel Loeb’s Third 
Point, have been sued for allegedly conspiring with analysts to manipulate the prices of 
stocks in which they have built up large positions.3 One worry is that, while sell-side analysts 
                                                            
1 See “Unsettled on Wall Street” Institutional Investor Magazine, 14 October 2003 and “Hey Big Spender, 
Analysts on Call” International Herald Tribune, 6 March 2007. Hedge fund trading volume accounts for 40 to 
50 percent of the daily trading volume in US stock markets (Cox, 2006). Moreover, according to Greenwich 
Associates, Wall Street collects $33 million a year in trading commissions from the average hedge fund versus 
$16 million from the average mutual fund. 
2 According to an analyst, “There was one day when I had at least 15 voicemail messages from two different 
SAC traders about how I was rating a particular stock. They don’t exactly say, ‘change your rating or else,’ but 
they give you a hyper-charged sales pitch on why you should change it.” See Vickers (2003). 
3 In one such lawsuit, Biovail, a Canadian drugs firm listed in New York and Toronto, claims that analysts 
published a negative report or “hatchet job” on Biovail at the behest of SAC, based on information provided by 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023032
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no longer need to contend with investment banking-driven agency issues (Dugar and Nathan 
(1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), and Barber, Lehavy, and 
Trueman (2007)), they must still grapple with hedge fund-induced conflicts of interests.4 
Motivated by these concerns, we explore the relationship between hedge fund stock 
holdings and sell-side analyst recommendations. We ask the following: Do changes in hedge 
fund equity positions impact analyst recommendation revisions? Along the same lines, are 
analysts more likely to issue favorable recommendations for stocks held by hedge funds? If 
so, are those favorable recommendations biased, i.e., do they forecast returns negatively? Do 
hedge funds take advantage of the recommendation optimism by offloading their shares of 
stocks heavily favored by analysts? The answers to these questions may shed light on the 
agency issues confronting sell-side research in the aftermath of the 2003 Global Research 
Analyst Settlement.  
The empirical results are striking. We find that analysts revise their recommendations 
to fall in line with hedge fund stock purchases and sales. After controlling for other factors 
affecting analyst recommendations, we show that an analyst is 13.5 percent more likely to 
upgrade a stock that was purchased by hedge funds last quarter. Conversely, an analyst is 
10.6 percent more likely to downgrade a stock that was sold by hedge funds in the previous 
quarter.5 These results are statistically meaningful, and manifest in analyst recommendation 
levels as well. Stocks predominantly owned by hedge funds in a given quarter tend to attract 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the hedge fund. See “Hedge Funds and Equity Research: Fair Comment or Foul?” The Economist, 1 April 2006, 
and “SEC Looks at Hedge Funds’ Trades” The Wall Street Journal, 13 February 2009.  
4 The dramatic increase in hedge fund assets under management from about US$0.8 trillion at the end of 2003 to 
about US$1.9 trillion at the end of 2010 (according to the 2010 Hedge Fund Research report) and the demise of 
investment banking as a driver of analyst conflicts of interests suggest that hedge funds may have become much 
more important in shaping analyst behavior post 2003. 
5 Our findings are not driven by hedge funds reacting to analyst reports. Lagged stock purchases and sales by 
hedge funds continue to explain analyst recommendation revisions even after controlling for contemporaneous 
stock purchases and sales by hedge funds.  
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favorable recommendations from analysts in the next quarter. These results are consonant 
with Boni and Womack’s (2003) findings that approximately 70 percent of their investment 
professionals surveyed cited pressure from institutional investors as a main motivation for 
sell-side analysts to form positive views on the stocks that their clients hold.  
Next, we test whether stocks held by hedge funds deserve the praise lavished by 
analysts in their research reports. Specifically, we analyze the association between analyst 
recommendations and future three- and six-month stock returns to determine whether the 
optimistic recommendations for firms in which hedge funds have large positions are 
warranted. We find that the returns to buy and strong buy recommendations are more 
negative when hedge funds hold large positions in the stock. The three- and six-month size-
adjusted returns are 2.5 percent and 4.6 percent lower, respectively, for the top decile of 
stocks than for the bottom decile of stocks ranked by hedge fund ownership. 
Do hedge funds take advantage of the optimistic analyst reports by concurrently 
offloading their stock positions? We show that when analysts issue optimistic 
recommendations on stocks held by hedge funds, the funds are more likely to unwind their 
positions in those stocks during the same quarter. In particular, when the mean analyst 
consensus for a stock is equal to or greater than a buy, hedge funds are 14.7 percent more 
likely to unwind their positions in the same stock. Conversely, under the same circumstances, 
other institutional investors are 23.1 percent less likely to sell a stock.  
We carefully consider alternative explanations that could account for our results. One 
view is that analysts either process information slower than do hedge funds or infer 
information from hedge fund stock trades. However, we find that Institutional Investor all-
star analysts, who are presumably highly skilled and able to process information more 
efficiently than other analysts, are even more likely to upgrade stocks recently bought and 
4 
 
downgrade stocks recently sold by hedge funds. Another view is that analysts tip hedge funds 
regarding the contents of their forthcoming reports (Irvine, Lipson and Puckett (2007) and 
Juergens and Lindsey (2009)). Yet, changes in hedge fund holdings measured at the end of 
the previous quarter continue to explain recommendation revisions even when we introduce a 
minimum two-week gap between quarter end and the recommendation revision date, 
indicating that tipping is unlikely to drive our results. Alternatively, our findings may be 
driven by equity market neutral hedge funds such as Numeric Investors (Perold and Tierney, 
1997) that employ quantitative models to predict analyst earnings forecasts or 
recommendation revisions. We show that the results are virtually unchanged when we 
remove hedge fund firms offering equity market neutral funds from the sample, indicating 
that the ability of hedge funds to predict analyst behavior is not responsible for our results.   
In line with an agency explanation, we find that relative to other hedge funds, high 
dollar turnover hedge funds, which generate significant brokerage commissions for 
investment banks, are better able to influence analysts into crafting sympathetic reports. 
Analysts are 11.3 percent more likely to upgrade stocks recently bought by hedge funds in the 
top dollar turnover quartile, but are 4 percent less likely to do so for stocks recently bought by 
other hedge funds. Likewise, analysts are 7.9 percent more likely to downgrade stocks 
recently sold by hedge funds in the top dollar turnover quartile, but are 3.2 percent less likely 
to do so for other hedge funds. Moreover, we show that an analyst is more likely to craft 
sympathetic recommendation reports for hedge funds who are the prime brokerage clients of 
her investment bank. Analysts are 15.4 percent more likely to upgrade stocks recently 
purchased by their prime brokerage clients. Conversely, they are only 4.2 percent more likely 
to do so for stocks recently purchased by hedge funds who are not prime brokerage clients. 
Similarly, analysts are 15.1 percent more likely to downgrade stocks recently sold by their 
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prime brokerage clients. For stocks recently sold by hedge funds who do not prime with their 
investment banks, analysts are only 3.9 percent more likely issue downgrades.    
Overall, our results suggest that analysts empathize with the investment views of 
hedge funds. In doing so, we resonate with the following themes. Jackson (2005), and 
Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) argue that brokerage commissions drive analyst 
optimism. According to them, in the presence of short sales constraints, optimistic 
recommendations by analysts encourage investors to trade through the analysts’ brokerages. 
We uncover a different channel by which brokerage commissions may induce analyst 
optimism. Our results suggest that analysts are optimistic about stocks held by hedge funds, 
especially those with high turnover, as they do not want to go against the investment views of 
these important brokerage clients. Ljungqvist, Marston, Yan, Starks, and Wei (2007) argue 
that institutional investors value unbiased research and therefore exert a moderating influence 
on sell-side analyst recommendation bias. Our findings indicate that there is significant cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the relationship between institutional investors and sell-side 
analysts. On one hand, analysts craft unbiased reports for stocks held by traditional asset 
managers such as mutual funds who trade infrequently. On the other hand, analysts issue 
recommendations that fall in line with the investment views of hedge funds who trade 
frequently and can therefore potentially benefit from sympathetic recommendation revisions.6 
Mola and Guidolin (2009) contend that sell-side analysts tend to assign favorable ratings to 
stocks held by affiliated mutual funds that are managed by their investment banks. Similarly, 
                                                            
6 These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence which suggests that analysts treat hedge funds differently 
from other institutions. Richard Drake, an ABN Amro director of equity research, opines “[Wall Street] caters to 
the hedge funds and the high-turnover funds. It doesn’t even cater to long-term-oriented institutions like us. We 
typically own a stock anywhere from three to five years. But the Street has to play to the paying customer, and 
the paying customer now is hedge funds and the hot money. We’re not trading enough to make anyone rich.” 
See “Unsettled on Wall Street” Institutional Investor Magazine, 14 October 2003.  
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we find that analysts craft favorable reports for stocks purchased by affiliated hedge funds 
that are the prime brokerage clients of their investments banks.7 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data 
employed. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analyses. Section 4 presents a 
series of robustness tests including adjustments for sample selection and short sales, as well 
as tests of analyst relative recommendations. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Data 
 
Our data set consists of the intersection of four large databases: the Thomson 
Financial 13F institutional database constructed from institutional investors’ 13F filings, the 
I/B/E/S database of research analyst recommendations, the Centre for Research in Security 
Prices at Chicago (CRSP) stock data, and Compustat firm characteristics data.  The sample 
period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the last quarter of 2008. We time our sample 
to start after the 28 April 2003 Global Research Analyst Settlement which curtails investment 
banking driven conflicts of interests amongst sell-side analysts.  
We cull our main variable of interest, hedge fund long position data, from the 
Thomson Financial 13F institutional database. Institutions with more than $100 million in 
equities must report their equity ownership in quarterly 13F filings to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (henceforth SEC). The majority of institutions (such as pension funds, 
endowments, mutual funds, and hedge funds) are required to report equity positions in excess 
of ten thousand shares or $200,000 in market value for all firms traded on an exchange or 
                                                            
7 Our results are not driven by affiliation as defined by Mola and Guidolin (2009). They hold even after we 
remove affiliated analyst recommendations from our sample. In this case, an analyst is affiliated to a hedge fund 
if the fund is managed by the analyst’s investment bank.  
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quoted on the Nasdaq National Market System. The institutions report aggregate holdings for 
their firm, e.g., hedge fund family, regardless of how many individual fund portfolios they 
manage. For example, Paulson & Co. manages several hedge funds including Paulson 
International, Paulson Enhanced, Paulson Advantage, Paulson Advantage Plus, and Paulson 
Credit Opportunities. The data do not suffer from the selection biases inherent in hedge fund 
commercial databases (see Fung and Hsieh (2009)), which are based on information provided 
voluntarily by hedge funds. 
To identify hedge fund families in the Thomson Financial 13F institutional database, 
we draw on the filtering methodology of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004). First, every year 
between 2003 and 2008, we obtain from Bloomberg a list of hedge funds that report 13F 
filings. Next, we look up each hedge fund by name in the 13F institutional database. We find 
records for 1,011 managers. These are the relatively large managers that hold sufficient 
amounts of U.S. stocks to exceed the $100 million reporting threshold. Then, we discard 
some managers because hedge fund assets only make up a small part of their aggregated 
institutional portfolio. For each manager, we check whether the firm is a registered 
investment adviser with the SEC. Registration is a prerequisite for conducting non-hedge 
fund business such as advising mutual funds and pension plans. If the institution is not 
registered, we include it in our sample. If the manager is registered, we check the manager’s 
Form ADV. To include a registered manager in our sample, we require (a) that at least 50 
percent of its clients are “Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or “High net 
worth individuals,” and (b) that it charges a performance fee. This process leaves us with 711 
managers.  
During our sample period, the I/B/E/S dataset records 194,507 recommendations for 
6,343 unique companies made by 7,367 analysts at 514 brokerages. The Thomson Financial 
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13F database reports holdings data on 8,104 unique companies. The intersection of the four 
databases contains 4,872 unique companies. I/B/E/S codes recommendations from one 
(strong buy) to five (sell). As is standard in the literature, we reverse the order so that larger 
numbers indicate more buoyant recommendations. One issue is that new, reiterated, or 
revised recommendations arrive and are recorded by I/B/E/S irregularly and relatively 
infrequently when compared to earnings forecasts. We therefore follow the algorithm 
outlined in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) and Loh and Stulz (2011) to determine 
whether a recommendation is an upgrade, a downgrade, a reiteration, or a fresh 
recommendation.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics on our data. It includes information on the size of 
hedge fund holdings, other institutional holdings, mean recommendation levels, stock market 
capitalization, stock book-to-market equity, stock volume, and stock cumulative abnormal 
returns over the last six months, averaged across stocks and quarters.8 From Table 1, it is 
clear that other institutional holdings dwarf hedge fund holdings. On average, hedge funds 
hold 6.2 percent of a stock while other institutions hold 54.8 percent of a stock. Therefore, the 
Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007) finding that analysts are more objective 
when recommending stocks predominantly owned by institutions, may not necessarily apply 
to stocks chiefly held by hedge funds. 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Since the large institutional investors and hedge funds with equity holdings in excess of $100 million that we 
analyze are unlikely to invest in penny stocks and other very small stocks, we omit stocks with prices below $5 
from our sample. None of our baseline inferences change when we include these stocks in the analysis.  
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3. Empirical results 
 
3.1. Tests of analyst recommendations 
 
Our first set of tests focuses on the effect of changes in hedge fund long equity 
positions on analyst recommendation revisions. We ask whether sell-side analysts are more 
likely to upgrade stocks purchased and downgrade stocks sold by hedge funds last quarter. 
Our tests control for the impact of purchases and sales by other institutional investors 
(excluding hedge funds) to understand the differential impact of hedge funds versus 
traditional asset management on sell-side analyst behavior. Finally, we also conduct 
empirical tests on analyst recommendation levels. We ask whether the mean consensus 
recommendation and individual analyst recommendations can be explained by hedge fund 
stock holdings. 
Other prior studies have examined analyst conflicts of interests using analyst forecast 
optimism. However, investors often prefer positive earnings surprises. As shown in O’Brien 
(1988), this provides analysts an incentive to shade their earnings estimates so that the 
company can exceed the forecast. As a result, there are competing optimistic and pessimistic 
influences on analyst earnings forecasts. No such competing influences exist for analyst 
recommendations. Moreover, unlike earnings forecasts, analyst recommendations readily 
translate into a direct course of action for investors, i.e., buy versus sell. Therefore, hedge 
funds are more likely to appreciate inflated recommendations, as opposed to optimistic 
earnings forecasts, on the stocks that they hold. Since it is easy to evaluate the accuracy of 
analyst forecasts by comparing the forecast estimates with actual earnings, the cost of a 
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biased earnings forecast may also be greater than that of a biased recommendation. In line 
with this reasoning, Agrawal and Chen (2007) and Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) do 
not find evidence of investment banking induced conflicts of interests when examining 
analyst earnings forecasts.   
The baseline cross-sectional regressions that we estimate can be expressed as: 
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where tjiUPGRADE ,,  is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when analyst i 
upgrades stock j in quarter t, and a value of zero otherwise. 1,_ −tjBUYHF is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one when hedge fund ownership of stock j increases in quarter 
ݐ − 1, and a value of zero otherwise, while 1,__ −tjBUYINSTOTHER  is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one when other institutional investor (excluding hedge funds) ownership 
of stock j increases in quarter ݐ − 1, and a value of zero otherwise. tjiDOWNGRADE ,, , 
1,_ −tjSELLHF , and 1,__ −tjSELLINSTOTHER  are the analogous indicator variables for 
analyst downgrades, hedge fund stock sales, and other institution stock sales. In addition, for 
stock j, 1, −tjVOLUME  is daily volume scaled by shares outstanding and averaged over the last 
six months, 1, −tjME  is market equity, 2,)/( −tjMEBE  is book-to-market equity, and 
1,_ −tjCARLAG  is past six-month, size decile-adjusted, buy and hold return. We control for 
the stock specific variables to account for the potential impact of stock size on analyst 
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recommendations and in response to Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee’s (2004) findings that 
analysts generally recommend high volume, extreme growth, and positive momentum stocks. 
The independent variables OTHER_INST_BUY and OTHER_INST_SELL are included to 
cater for the possible moderating influence of institutional investors who do not manage 
hedge funds. The accounting variable BE/ME is measured with a two-quarter lag following 
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004). The standard errors are clustered by firm and year 
to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and 
Petersen (2009)).  
 The coefficient estimates on HF_BUY and HF_SELL reported columns one to four of 
Table 2 are consistent with the view that analysts revise their recommendations in sympathy 
with hedge fund stock purchases and sales. Controlling for co-variation with other variables, 
an analyst is 13.5 percent more likely to upgrade a stock that was purchased by hedge funds 
last quarter. Conversely, an analyst is 10.6 percent more likely to downgrade a stock that was 
sold by hedge funds last quarter. The coefficient estimates on HF_BUY and HF_SELL are 
both statistically significant at the one percent level. Interestingly, trades by other institutional 
investors impact analyst recommendation revisions in the opposite way. The coefficient 
estimates on OTHER_INST_BUY and OTHER_INST_SELL indicate that analysts are 7.5 
percent less likely to upgrade stocks recently bought and 12.3 percent less likely to 
downgrade stocks recently sold by other institutions. These estimates are consistent with the 
Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007) view that institutional investors in general 
exert a moderating influence on analyst recommendation optimism.  
To check for robustness, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place of 
the OLS cross-sectional regressions. Specifically, we first run cross-sectional regressions for 
each quarter. Then, we report the time-series averages of the coefficient estimates, and use 
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the time-series standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama and 
MacBeth regressions control for correlation in residuals across different firms within the 
same quarter. We compute the standard errors using the method of Newey and West (1987) 
with a three-quarter lag to adjust for dependence across time. The results, reported in columns 
five through eight of Table 2, corroborate our previous findings and indicate that they are 
robust to alternative model specifications. We continue to find that hedge fund stock 
purchases and sales exert a strong impact on analyst recommendation revisions in the 
following quarter.     
 We also examine the impact of hedge fund and other institutional holdings on (i) 
CONSENSUS_REC the mean consensus recommendation level, (ii) ANALYST_REC 
individual analyst recommendations, (iii) BUY_CONSENSUS an indicator variable that takes 
a value of one when the mean consensus equals to or exceeds that of a buy recommendation, 
and a value of zero otherwise, and (iv) BUY_REC an indicator variable that takes a value of 
one when the individual analyst recommendation is a buy or strong buy, and a value of zero 
otherwise.9 The regression on CONSENSUS_REC is expressed as 
tjtj
tjtjtj
tjtjtj
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HOLDINSTcOTHERHOLDbHFaRECCONSENSUS
,1,
2,1,1,
1,1,,
_
)/()log(
____
ε++
+++
++=
−
−−−
−−
 (3) 
where 1,_ −tjHOLDHF is the total shares of a stock j held by hedge funds at the end of 
quarter t-1 and scaled by the number of shares outstanding, and 1,__ −tjHOLDINSTOTHER  
is the total shares of stock j held by other institutions at the end of quarter t-1 and scaled by 
the number of shares outstanding.  
                                                            
9 We obtain similar inferences when we examine the median consensus recommendation instead of the mean.  
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The coefficient estimates on HF_HOLD reported in Table 3 are consistent with the 
view that analysts are more likely to issue favorable recommendations for stocks 
predominantly held by hedge funds. Across all model specifications, hedge fund holdings 
positively and significantly impact analyst recommendation levels. The coefficient estimates 
on other institution holdings OTHER_INST_HOLD in the multivariate regressions, while 
positive, are significantly lower than those on hedge fund holdings according to the F-test. 
Consistent with the findings of Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004), the coefficient 
estimates on the control variables reveal that analysts favor high growth stocks and positive 
momentum stocks.  
Mola and Guidolin (2009) find that sell-side analysts tend to assign frequent and 
favorable ratings to stocks held by affiliated mutual funds that are managed by the analysts’ 
investment banks. There may be concerns that our results are driven by the similarly 
affiliated hedge funds in our sample. For example, an analyst working for Goldman Sachs 
may issue favorable recommendations for stocks held by hedge funds operated by Goldman 
Sachs, e.g., the now defunct Goldman Sachs Global Alpha fund. To cater for such concerns, 
we remove all affiliated analyst recommendations from the sample and redo the analyses in 
Tables 2 and 3. Our results are robust to this adjustment.10  
Another concern is that our regressions may spuriously capture hedge funds’ reaction to 
analyst recommendation revisions instead. Hedge funds may swiftly incorporate information 
from analyst recommendations into their trades, and therefore, purchase stocks upgraded and 
sell stocks downgraded by sell-side analysts in the current quarter. Our regressions relate 
analyst recommendation revisions in quarter t to changes in hedge fund equity positions in 
quarter ݐ − 1. However, if changes in hedge fund holdings are sufficiently auto-correlated 
                                                            
10 These results are available upon request.   
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then this may explain the positive coefficient estimates on lagged HF_BUY and HF_SELL in 
our regressions. To address this concern, we re-estimate the Table 2 regressions after 
including contemporaneous HF_BUY and HF_SELL, as additional independent variables. We 
find that, even with the additional controls, the coefficient estimates on lagged HF_BUY and 
HF_SELL continue to be positive and statistically significant for all regression specifications. 
 
3.2.  Tests of stock returns 
 
Do stocks held by hedge funds deserve the praise lavished by analysts? Our next set 
of tests focuses on the post recommendation performance of stocks owned by hedge funds 
and favored by analysts. Specifically, we test whether the size decile-adjusted, buy-and-hold, 
three-month and six-month returns following the consensus measuring window are affected 
by the interaction between hedge fund ownership and the indicator variable that is equal to 
one when the consensus equals to or exceeds a buy recommendation. The return regression 
that we estimate is as follows: 
tjtjtj
tjtjtj
tjtjtj
CARgLAGMEBEf
MEeHOLDHFCONSENSUSdBUY
HOLDcHFCONSENSUSbBUYaRETSTOCK
,1,2,
1,2,1,
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_)/(
)log(_*_
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ε+++
++
++=
−−
−−−
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 (4) 
 where tjRETSTOCK ,_ is either the three-month or six-month, size decile-adjusted, buy-
and-hold return starting in quarter t for stock j, and the other variables are as per defined 
earlier. We control for size, book-to-market equity, and six-month lagged cumulative returns 
given their documented explanatory power (see Banz (1981), Fama and French (1992), and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). To adjust for within-firm and within-year dependence, we 
estimate standard errors clustered by firm and year.  
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 The results are reported in columns one and three of Panel A Table 4.11 For the 
regression on three-month returns, the coefficient estimate on the interaction between 
BUY_CONSENSUS and HF_HOLD is negative and statistically significant at the ten percent 
level. Statistical significance improves when we analyze six-month returns. The analogous 
coefficient estimate for the six-month returns regression is negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. These results broadly indicate that stocks predominantly 
held by hedge funds do not deserve the buy and strong buy recommendations lavished on 
them by analysts. Together with the findings from the previous subsection, they suggest that 
analysts issue overly optimistic reports for stocks predominantly held by hedge funds. The 
other coefficient estimates are consistent with the prior literature. The positive and 
statistically significant (at the one percent level) coefficients on BUY_CONSENSUS echo the 
findings of Womack (1996) and indicate that analysts’ buy and strong buy recommendations 
have investment value. The coefficients on HF_HOLD are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero at the ten percent level, reflecting the Griffin and Xu (2009) finding that hedge funds do 
not on average possess stock selection ability.  
To gauge economic significance, we replace HF_HOLD with RANK_HF_HOLD, a 
decile-ranked variable of HF_HOLD scaled by nine, and re-estimate the return regressions. 
The decile-ranked variable takes values between zero and nine. Therefore, RANK_HF_HOLD 
takes values between zero and one. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between 
BUY_CONSENSUS and RANK_HF_HOLD reflects the difference in three-month (or six-
month) returns between stocks in the top and bottom hedge fund ownership deciles, whose 
consensus recommendation equals to or exceeds a buy. The results reported in columns two 
and four of Panel A Table 4 suggest that stocks favored by analysts in the top hedge fund 
                                                            
11 Our results are robust to using market-adjusted returns. 
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ownership decile underperform those in the bottom hedge fund ownership decile by 2.5 
percent and 4.6 percent over the subsequent three and six months, respectively.   
 To check for robustness, we also estimate the Eq. (4) return regressions with 
BUY_REC in place of BUY_CONSENSUS and report the results in Panel B Table 4. As 
defined previously, BUY_REC is the indicator variable that takes a value of one when an 
analyst issues a buy or strong buy. The results from the return regressions with BUY_REC 
corroborate those with BUY_CONSENSUS. They indicate that for stocks with buy or strong 
buy recommendations, those predominantly owned by hedge funds underperform those 
eschewed by hedge funds. The coefficient estimates on the interaction between BUY_REC 
and RANK_HF_HOLD indicate that the underperformance is 1.1 percent over the next three 
months and 2.4 percent over the next six months. These estimates are both statistically 
significant at the one percent level. In results not reported, we run Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regressions in place of the OLS cross-sectional regressions with clustered standard errors, and 
obtain similar inferences.  
 
3.3. Tests of hedge fund stock ownership  
 
Do hedge funds take advantage of the optimistic views of sell-side analysts by 
concurrently unwinding their stock positions? Our third set of tests examines changes in 
hedge fund ownership for stocks that are heavily favored by sell-side analysts. If hedge funds 
successfully influence analysts into issuing optimistic reports on the stocks that they hold, 
then the funds will be incentivized to offload their positions in those stocks to take advantage 
of the market’s reaction to analysts’ buy and strong buy recommendations.  
To test this, we estimate the following OLS and logit regressions: 
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where tjHOLDHF ,_Δ  is the change in hedge fund ownership in stock j in quarter t, 
tjSELLHF ,_ is an indicator variable that equals to one when the change in hedge fund 
ownership in stock j is negative in quarter t, and equals to zero otherwise, and the 
independent variables are as per defined previously. We control for size, book-to-market 
equity, and past six-month cumulative stock returns in response to Griffin and Xu’s (2009) 
findings that, relative to mutual funds, hedge funds tend to prefer smaller firms, value stocks, 
and stocks with low past returns.  To cater for within-firm and within-year dependence, we 
estimate robust standard errors clustered by firm and year.  
 The results from the OLS and logit regressions are reported in the first and second 
columns of Table 5, respectively. They indicate that hedge funds are more likely to sell 
stocks that attract buoyant recommendations. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on 
BUY_CONSENSUS in the logit regression indicates that hedge funds are 14.7 percent more 
likely to sell a stock when the consensus is greater than or equal to a buy during the same 
quarter. Hedge funds appear to be trading against the recommendations of sell-side analysts. 
This effect is statistically significant at the one percent level (t-statistic = 7.34).  
Interestingly, these findings do not apply to other institutional investors. When we 
estimate the analogous regression with ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD where 
ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD is the change in other institution’s stock ownership, the coefficient 
estimate on BUY_CONSENSUS is positive and statistically significant at the one percent 
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level. This suggests that other institutions are more likely to increase their positions in a stock 
when analysts are optimistic. Similar inferences obtain when we estimate the regression with 
OTHER_INST_SELL, an indicator variable that equals to one when the change in stock 
ownership by other institutions is negative during that quarter, and equals zero otherwise. The 
coefficient estimate on BUY_CONSENSUS indicates that other institutions are 23.1 percent 
less likely to sell stock when the consensus is greater than or equal to a buy. These results are 
reported in columns three and four of Table 5. They echo those of Brown, Wei, and Wermers 
(2009) who show that mutual funds tend to herd into stocks with analyst consensus upgrades 
and herd out of stocks with analyst consensus downgrades.  
 
3.4. Discussion 
 
The results dovetail with the view that sell-side analysts are reluctant to go against the 
investment views of their hedge fund clients. However, they may also be consistent with the 
view that hedge funds possess superior information relative to analysts or are more efficient 
at processing information. We label this alternative view the superiority hypothesis.  
For the superiority hypothesis to hold, hedge funds should possess superior stock 
selection skills relative to sell-side analysts. Womack (1996) shows that sell-side analysts’ 
buy and sell recommendations embody valuable information. Conversely, Griffin and Xu 
(2009) document using hedge fund long equity holdings that hedge funds, on average, do not 
possess stock selection skills. So the prior literature indicates that sell-side analysts, not 
hedge funds, should possess superior information or be more efficient at processing 
information. Indeed, the coefficient estimates on BUY_CONSENSUS and HF_HOLD in the 
return regressions reported in Table 4 corroborate this view. In all regression specifications, 
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the coefficient estimates on BUY_CONSENSUS are positive and statistically significant at the 
five percent level while those on HF_HOLD are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
These results cast doubt on the superiority hypothesis.  
Perhaps one concern is that our results may be driven by low ability stock analysts 
who follow hedge fund trades or who react slowly to new information. If this is true then it 
must be the case that Institutional Investor all-star analysts, who are presumably highly 
skilled, resourceful, and efficient at processing information, are less likely to issue revisions 
that appear sympathetic to hedge fund investment views. To test this, we re-estimate the 
regressions in Table 2 for two sets of analysts: Institutional Investor all-star analysts and non 
all-stars, and report the results in Table 6. We find that during the year when they are 
evaluated for the all-star poll, Institutional Investor all-star analysts are even more likely to 
upgrade stocks recently bought by hedge funds and downgrade stocks recently sold by hedge 
funds, than their non all-star counterparts. Specifically, Institutional Investor all-stars are 26.4 
percent more likely to upgrade a stock bought by hedge funds in the previous quarter. Non 
all-stars on the other hand are only 17 percent more likely to revise upwards their 
recommendations on the same stock. Also, Institutional Investor all-stars are 24.8 percent 
more likely to downgrade a stock sold by hedge funds in the previous quarter. Conversely, 
non all-stars are only 13.7 percent more likely to revise downwards their recommendations 
on the same stock. These differences between all-stars and non all-stars are statistically 
significant at the one percent level as indicated by the coefficient estimates on the interaction 
variable reported in columns five and six of Table 6. These results cast further doubt on the 
superiority hypothesis. 
An alternative story is that the findings are driven by equity market neutral hedge 
funds that employ models to predict analyst earnings forecasts or recommendations. Perold 
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and Tierney (1997) provide an excellent account of how Numeric Investors L.P., a 
quantitative equity market neutral hedge fund, developed an earnings momentum trading 
strategy that takes advantage of herding amongst analysts. To distinguish from this story, we 
cull hedge fund data from Barclayhedge, Hedge Fund Research, and Lipper TASS at the end 
of 2010. The union of these three databases includes 31,798 funds of which 1,256 are equity 
market neutral funds.12 We then remove fund families in our database with at least one equity 
market neutral fund and redo the baseline analysis in Table 2. We find that the results are 
virtually unchanged suggesting that our findings are not driven by the ability of hedge funds 
to predict analyst behavior.    
If the desire to generate brokerage commissions drives analyst behaviour, then 
analysts should come under greater pressure to conform to the investment views of their most 
important hedge fund clients, i.e., those with high dollar turnover. To explore this, we re-
estimate the Table 2 recommendation revision regressions after including separate 
independent variables to capture the impact of high dollar turnover versus non high dollar 
turnover hedge funds. Specifically, for the UPGRADE regression, we replace HF_BUY with 
TOP_HF_BUY, stock purchase by top dollar turnover hedge funds, and 
NON_TOP_HF_BUY, stock purchase by other hedge funds. For the DOWNGRADE 
regression, we replace HF_SELL with TOP_HF_SELL, stock sale by top dollar turnover 
hedge funds, and NON_TOP_HF_SELL, stock sale by other hedge funds. Top dollar turnover 
hedge funds are funds whose dollar turnover measured over the last quarter fall in the top 
quartile.13 We find that analysts are only more likely to upgrade stocks recently bought and 
                                                            
12 The union includes multiple share classes of the same fund. Of the 31,798 funds, 20,471 stopped reporting 
returns by December 2010.  
13 One caveat is that since we measure turnover based on changes in quarterly stock holdings, we may 
misclassify high frequency algorithmic traders and statistical arbitrage funds such as Renaissance Technologies 
as low turnover funds. However, it is unclear whether analysts who issue recommendations on a quarterly basis 
should come under pressure from such funds who transact on an intraday basis. 
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downgrade stocks recently sold by top dollar turnover funds. The coefficient estimates on 
TOP_HF_BUY and TOP_HF_SELL are positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level, while the coefficient estimates on NON_TOP_HF_BUY and 
NON_TOP_HF_SELL are negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero. The F-test 
confirms that the difference in coefficient estimates for TOP_HF_BUY and 
NON_TOP_HF_BUY and the analogous difference for TOP_HF_SELL and 
NON_TOP_HF_SELL are reliably different from zero. These results are reported in Table 7 
and corroborate the agency view that analyst recommendation revisions are influenced, at 
least in part, by the desire to generate brokerage commissions. 
Next, we explore the link between hedge funds and analysts via prime brokerage. 
Hedge funds pay significant fees to investment banks for prime brokerage services such as 
financing and securities lending. An analyst may come under greater pressure to conform to 
the investment views of her investment bank’s prime brokerage clients than to other hedge 
funds. We obtain hedge fund prime broker information from the Barclayhedge, Hedge Fund 
Research, and Lipper TASS union described earlier in this section. As the data provide a 
snapshot of hedge fund prime brokers in 2010, we only perform our analysis for the last two 
years of our sample period, i.e., 2007 and 2008, implicitly assuming that hedge funds did not 
change their prime brokers between 2007 and 2010. Given that hedge funds may switch 
prime brokers year on year, this is likely to introduce noise to our analysis and make it harder 
to obtain significant results.  Next, we re-estimate the recommendation revision regressions 
after replacing the independent variable HF_BUY with HF_CLIENT_BUY and 
HF_NON_CLIENT_BUY in Eq. (1) and replacing the independent variable HF_SELL with 
HF_CLIENT_SELL and HF_NON_CLIENT_SELL in Eq. (2). HF_CLIENT_BUY is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one when hedge funds who are prime brokerage 
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clients of the analyst’s investment bank purchase the stock, and takes a value of zero 
otherwise. HF_NON_CLIENT_BUY is an indicator variable for stock purchases by hedge 
funds who are not prime brokerage clients. HF_CLIENT_SELL and 
HF_NON_CLIENT_SELL are the analogous indicator variables for stock sales by prime 
brokerage clients and non clients, respectively. The regressions include controls for prime 
broker fixed effects to account for the possibility that the propensity of analysts to issue 
upgrades and downgrades differs systematically across prime brokers. 
The results reported in Table 8 support the agency view. We find that analysts revise 
their recommendations in line with the investment views of their prime broker clients only. 
Specifically, an analyst is 15.4 percent more likely to upgrade a stock recently bought and 
15.1 percent more likely to downgrade a stock recently sold by her prime brokerage client. 
Both these effects are statistically meaningful at the one percent level. Conversely, hedge 
funds who are not prime brokerage clients exert a statistically unreliable impact on analyst 
recommendation revisions. The differences between the coefficient estimates for 
HF_CLIENT_BUY and HF_NON_CLIENT_BUY and those for HF_CLIENT_SELL and 
HF_NON_CLIENT_SELL are both statistically significant at the one percent level according 
to the F-test.  
 
4. Robustness tests 
    
In this section, we present a series of tests to ascertain the robustness of our results.  
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4.1. Sample selection 
 
One critique of the cross-sectional regression analyses in Table 2 is that analyst 
coverage may not be exogenous. Analysts may strategically choose to publish research about 
companies that are primarily traded by hedge funds. Therefore, an analyst’s decision to cover 
a stock may be linked to variables that are related to hedge funds’ propensity to trade a stock. 
The coefficients in Table 2 that supposedly explain variation in analyst recommendation 
revisions may be contaminated by correlation between the residuals in those cross-sectional 
regressions and the unobserved factors that shape analyst coverage. To ameliorate these 
issues, we follow Ramadorai (2011) and employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure to 
correct for possible sample selection bias.14 To apply the procedure, we first estimate a probit 
regression on the entire universe of bank-firm quarters to determine the factors underlying 
coverage. The inverse Mills ratio is then computed from this first stage probit and 
incorporated into the regressions on UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE so as to correct for 
selection bias.  
To implement the Heckman correction, a critical identifying assumption is that there 
are some variables that explain selection, but not analyst recommendation revisions. If there 
is no such “exclusion restriction,” the model is identified by only distributional assumptions 
about the residuals, which could lead to problems in estimating the parameters of the model. 
Following Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006), the exclusion restriction that we 
employ is bank existing coverage of the Fama and French (1997) industry that the company 
belongs to. The broader the bank’s coverage of company j’s industry, the lower the cost of 
                                                            
14 Since we run the Heckman procedure on all firm-bank-quarters, to keep the number of observations 
manageable, we restrict the sample to banks that issue at least 1000 recommendations during the sample period. 
This leaves us with a sample of 52 banks and approximately 3.6 million firm-bank-quarters on which to run the 
sample selection correction.  
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covering company j’s stock, and hence the more likely that the bank’s analyst publishes 
research on the company. At the same time, the bank’s coverage of company’s industry is 
unlikely to have an impact on the analyst recommendation revision itself. To the extent that 
analyst coverage is shaped by hedge funds’ propensity to trade a stock, the results of Griffin 
and Xu (2009) suggest that other variables that determine selection may include firm market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and past stock performance.  
The results from the Heckman correction are reported in Table 9. The coefficient 
estimates from the selection equation confirm our intuition that an analyst is more likely to 
cover firms belonging to industries that are already widely covered by her research 
department. In particular, the coefficient estimate on INDUSTRY_COVERAGE, our measure 
of a bank’s existing coverage of a firm’s industry is statistically significant at the one percent 
level. As shown in columns four and eight of Table 9, we find that the coefficient estimates 
on HF_BUY and HF_SELL are still positive and statistically significant at the one percent 
level even with the Heckman correction. This indicates that the prior cross-sectional 
regression results are not tainted by sample selection issues. 
 
4.2. Short sales 
 
Another concern with our results is that hedge funds do not only hold long equity 
positions. They can also short sell stocks and trade derivatives. Nonetheless, Griffin and Xu 
(2009) show that Thomson Financial 13F filings provide a reasonable indication of hedge 
funds’ equity exposures. They compute the correlation between the returns of hedge funds’ 
long equity positions from 13F filings and hedge funds’ total portfolio returns from 
commercial hedge fund databases (namely, Altvest, TASS, and MAR), and find that the 
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monthly return correlation for the median fund is 0.64. Still it is important to address the 
issue of short sales by hedge funds. In that effort, since hedge fund short position data are not 
publicly available, we employ short interest data from Compustat as a proxy. According to a 
study by Citigroup, hedge funds account for 40 percent of the total short sales in 2005 (see 
Williamson (2005)).  
With our proxy for hedge funds’ aggregate short positions, we re-do the analysis in 
Table 2. First, we estimate the impact of stock purchases and sales derived from hedge fund 
net equity positions (HF_NET_BUY and HF_NET_SELL) on analyst recommendation 
revisions. Next, we breakdown HF_NET_BUY into HF_BUY and HF_SHORT_BUY, where 
HF_SHORT_BUY represents short covering by hedge funds, and separately measure the 
impact of an increase in hedge fund long positions and of a reduction in hedge fund short 
positions on an analyst’s propensity to upgrade a stock. We conduct the analogous analysis 
for stock sales as well by breaking down HF_NET_SELL into HF_SELL and 
HF_SHORT_SELL. The results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient estimates on 
HF_NET_BUY and HF_NET_SELL indicate that our baseline results remain qualitatively 
unchanged when we examine hedge fund net equity exposure. When we breakdown the 
analysis into long versus short positions, we find that consistent with the notion that analysts 
are reluctant to issue recommendations that go against the investment views of their hedge 
fund clients, analysts are 11.9 percent more likely to upgrade stocks when hedge fund 
covered their short positions for those stocks, i.e., HF_SHORT_BUY is positive, and are 13.4 
percent more likely to downgrade stocks when hedge funds pressed their short positions for 
those stocks, i.e., HF_SHORT_SELL is positive.  
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4.3. Relative recommendations 
 
In the Table 3 analysis, we study recommendation optimism by focusing on the 
impact of hedge fund holdings on consensus and individual analyst recommendations. 
Another way to measure recommendation optimism is to use relative recommendations. The 
challenge is to identify a reference group of analysts who a priori are more focused on 
generating brokerage commissions than are other analysts. A possible reference group could 
be analysts working for large bulge bracket investment banks. Relative to their less highly 
paid counterparts working at smaller investment banks, these analysts could come under 
greater pressure to generate brokerage commissions so as to justify their larger compensation 
packages.  
Following this line of reasoning, we compute the relative recommendations (relative 
to the median consensus) of analysts working in the top 16 investment banks based on debt 
and equity underwriting market share in 2000 – 2002 as in Ljunqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm 
(2006) and Ljunqvist, Marston, Starks, Yan, and Wei (2007). These banks include Goldman 
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, CS First Boston, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase, 
Lehman Brothers, Bank of America, UBS Warburg, Deutsche Bank, Bear Stearns, Prudential 
Volpe, CIBC World Markets, Fleet Boston, SG Cowen Securities, and Thomas Weisel 
Partners.  Next, we explore the impact of hedge fund holdings on the relative 
recommendations of analysts working in these investment banks by estimating the Eq. (3) 
regressions with relative recommendation as the dependent variable. We find that the 
baseline results are robust to using relative recommendation as a proxy for analyst optimism. 
The coefficient estimates on HF_HOLD are positive and statistically significant at the one 
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percent level for the regression on relative recommendations. Conversely, the coefficient 
estimates on OTHER_INST_HOLD are statistically indistinguishable from zero.15 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The sweeping regulatory reforms that lead to the 2003 Global Research Analyst 
Settlement have significantly curtailed the investment banking-induced conflicts of interests 
that plagued the analyst profession. Some market watchers believe that, as a result, sell-side 
analysts are now more independent. This paper challenges this view. In line with anecdotal 
evidence which suggests that sell-side analysts are now under tremendous pressure to 
generate brokerage commissions and fees from their hedge fund clients, we show that sell-
side analysts revise their recommendations to fall in line with hedge fund investment views. 
Consequently, for stocks predominantly held by hedge funds, analysts tend to issue buy and 
strong buy recommendations. These stocks do not deserve the flattering reports lavished by 
analysts. The favorable recommendations parlay into poor three-month and six-month stock 
returns going forward. Moreover, hedge funds appear to take advantage of the optimistic 
prognostications by concurrently unwinding their stock positions. These results cannot be 
explained by the story that relative to analysts, hedge funds possess superior information or 
are better at processing information. We show that high ability Institutional Investor all-star 
analysts are even more likely to upgrade stocks recently bought and downgrade stocks 
recently sold by hedge funds. Moreover, consistent with the notion that analysts are driven by 
brokerage commissions and fees, we find that high dollar turnover hedge funds and funds that 
are prime brokerage clients are particularly apt at influencing analysts into issuing 
                                                            
15 These results are available upon request.  
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recommendations that sympathize with fund investment views. Our findings suggest that in a 
post Spitzer-era, Wall Street research departments having been weaned off investment 
banking revenues must still contend with hedge fund-induced conflicts of interests.  
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Variable Number Mean Std Dev Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
CONSENSUS_REC 59,981 3.639 0.606 3.200 3.654 4.000 
HF_HOLD 59,981 0.062 0.071 0.015 0.039 0.085 
OTHER_INST_HOLD 59,981 0.548 0.245 0.359 0.585 0.752 
ME (in $ millions) 59,981 4,997 19,103 283 752 2,624 
BE/ME 59,981 0.493 0.325 0.282 0.445 0.637 
LAG_CAR6 59,975 0.037 0.335 -0.134 -0.005 0.141 
VOLUME 59,981 8.080 9.164 3.335 5.967 10.108 
Table 1
Summary statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. CONSENSUS_REC is the average analyst recommendation in quarter t. HF_HOLD is the
sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds at quarter t-1 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. OTHER_INST_HOLD is the sum of shares held by
other institutions (excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity
measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at the end of a quarter t-2.
LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the daily volume scaled by shares outstanding (in
percentage) and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. The sample period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of
2008.
Independent variables
HF_BUY 0.140** 0.135** 0.137** 0.127**
(4.10) (4.20) (5.31) (4.59)
OTHER_INST_BUY -0.075* -0.049
(-2.11) (-1.76)
HF_SELL 0.105** 0.106** 0.110** 0.114**
(2.79) (3.16) (4.24) (4.55)
OTHER_INST_SELL -0.123** -0.036
(-4.36) (-1.28)
Log(ME) 0.026** -0.110** 0.023 -0.109**
(2.66) (-7.70) (1.86) (-8.56)
BE/ME 0.066 -0.117* -0.029 -0.063
(0.91) (‐2.14) (-0.42) (-0.99)
LAG_CAR6 0.156 -0.132 0.029 -0.022
(1.12) (-0.94) (0.21) (-0.16)
VOLUME -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(-0.18) (0.61) (0.12) (0.41)
Pseudo R-Square 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008
Number of observations 59,597 59,593 59,597 59,593
Table 2
Regressions on analyst recommendation revisions
This table reports results from regressions on individual analyst recommendation revisions. Two sets of regressions are estimated. The dependent variables are UPGRADE and
DOWNGRADE. UPGRADE is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the recommendation is an upgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. DOWNGRADE is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if the recommendation is a downgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. We follow the algorithm outlined in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) and
Loh and Stulz (2011) to determine whether a recommendation is an upgrade, a downgrade, a reiteration, or a fresh recommendation. Logit and Fama and MacBeth regressions are
estimated. The dependent variables are measured in quarter t. The independent variables include the following: HF_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change
in the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. OTHER_INST_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
change in the sum of shares of a firm held by other institutions (excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_SELL and
OTHER_INST_SELL are defined analogously. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to
market value of common equity measured at the end of a quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the
daily volume scaled by shares outstanding and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. The standard errors for the logit regressions are clustered by firm and
year to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and Petersen (2009)). For the Fama and MacBeth regressions, Newey and West (1987)
standard errors with a three-quarter lag are employed. The z-statistics and t-statistics derived from the standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period extends from the third
quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.
UPGRADE DOWNGRADE UPGRADE DOWNGRADE
Logit regressions Fama and MacBeth regressions
Dependent variables
Independent variables
HF_HOLD [A] 0.906** 0.736** 0.772** 0.766** 2.685** 2.132** 1.859** 1.806**
(7.36) (5.87) (5.64) (5.52) (9.05) (6.10) (7.59) (7.13)
OTHER_INST_HOLD [B] 0.182** 0.109** 0.317** 0.198**
(5.84) (3.56) (3.00) (2.97)
Log(ME) -0.061** -0.012* -0.432** -0.011
(-7.16) (-2.07) (-11.21) (-0.98)
BE/ME -0.354** -0.347** -1.268** -0.867**
(-7.73) (-7.49) (-9.99) (-9.99)
LAG_CAR6 0.197** 0.179** 0.762** 0.411**
(9.04) (6.62) (6.67) (8.11)
VOLUME -0.003** -0.003** -0.016** -0.003
(-4.59) (-5.62) (-5.26) (-1.79)
Difference F-statistics ( [A] - [B] ) 20.68 23.32 27.27 41.65
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.011 0.068 0.003 0.018 0.007 0.082 0.003 0.015
Number of observations 59,981 59,975 499,569 499,551 59,981 59,975 499,569 499,551
Table 3
Regressions on analyst recommendations  
Dependent variables
This table reports results from regressions on consensus recommendations and individual analyst recommendations. Four sets of regressions are estimated. The
dependent variables include: CONSENSUS_REC, ANALYST_REC, BUY_CONSENSUS, and BUY_REC. CONSENSUS_REC is the average analyst
recommendation. ANALYST_REC is the level of the individual recommendation. BUY_CONSENSUS is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the average
recommendation is equal to or greater than a 'Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. BUY_REC is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the individual
recommendation is a 'Buy' or 'Strong Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. OLS regressions are estimated for CONSENSUS REC and ANALYST_REC. Logit
regressions are estimated for BUY_CONSENSUS and BUY_REC. All the dependent variables are measured in quarter t. The independent variables include the
following: HF_HOLD is the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds at quarter t-1 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. OTHER_INST_HOLD is
the sum of shares held by other institutions (excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. ME (in $ millions) is the market 
value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at the end of a quarter t-
2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the daily volume scaled by shares outstanding and averaged
over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. OLS and Logit regressions are estimated. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-
firm and within-year correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and Petersen (2009)). The z-statistics and t-statistics derived from the standard errors are in parentheses.
The sample period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.
ANALYST_REC BUY_CONSENSUS BUY_RECCONSENSUS_REC
Independent variables
Panel A: Regressions with BUY_CONSENSUS
BUY_CONSENSUS 0.010** 0.018** 0.017** 0.029**
(3.18) (6.46) (3.25) (5.58)
HF_HOLD -0.006 0.022
(-0.19) (0.40)
RANK_HF_HOLD 0.005 0.016
(0.72) (1.25)
BUY_CONSENSUS  × HF_HOLD -0.080 -0.171**
(-1.87) (-3.00)
BUY_CONSENSUS  × RANK_HF_HOLD -0.025** -0.046**
(-4.09) (-5.83)
Log(ME) 0.001* 0.001* 0.004** 0.004**
(2.06) (2.14) (3.33) (3.39)
BE/ME -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.18) (-0.18)
LAG_CAR6 0.016 0.015 0.020 0.019
(1.07) (1.07) (0.48) (0.48)
Adjusted R-square 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Number of observations 59,883 59,883 59,883 59,883
Panel B: Regressions with BUY_REC
BUY_REC 0.005** 0.007** 0.012** 0.016**
(3.52) (7.13) (3.35) (5.40)
HF_HOLD 0.007 0.064
(0.32) (1.64)
RANK_HF_HOLD 0.009 0.027**
(1.68) (3.90)
BUY_REC × HF_HOLD -0.048** -0.127**
Dependent variables   
Table 4
Regressions on stock returns
This table reports OLS regressions on three-month and six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns. The
dependent variables are measured starting in quarter t. The independent variables are as follows: BUY_CONSENSUS is
an indicator variable that is equal to one if the average recommendation in quarter t-1 is equal to or greater than a 'Buy',
and is equal to zero otherwise. BUY_REC is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the individual recommendation
in quarter t-1 is a 'Buy' or 'Strong Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_HOLD is the sum of shares of a firm held by
hedge funds at quarter t-2 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. RANK_HF_HOLD is the decile ranked
variable of HF_HOLD divided by nine so that RANK_HF_HOLD ranges from zero to one. ME (in $ millions) is the
market value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-1 to market value
of common equity measured at the end of a quarter t-1. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold
returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the daily volume scaled by shares outstanding and averaged over the six
months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. For each dependent variable, four sets of regressions are estimated: The first
set includes BUY_CONSENSUS and HF_HOLD. The second set includes BUY_CONSENSUS and RANK_HF_HOLD.
The third set includes BUY_REC and HF_HOLD. The last set includes BUY_REC and RANK_HF_HOLD. Panel A
reports results from regressions with BUY_CONSENSUS while Panel B reports results from regressions with
BUY_REC. The regression standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year
correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and Petersen (2009)). The t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period
extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1%
l l
Three-month return Six-month return
(-4.87) (-3.83)
BUY_REC × RANK_HF_HOLD -0.011** -0.024**
(-4.48) (-5.02)
Log(ME) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.15) (0.49) (0.65) (1.04)
BE/ME -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003
(-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.13) (-0.09)
LAG_CAR6 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.007
(0.73) (0.72) (0.14) (0.13)
Adjusted R-square 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Number of observations 496,166 496,166 496,166 496,166
Independent variables ΔHF_HOLD HF_SELL ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD OTHER_INST_SELL
BUY_CONSENSUS -0.002** 0.147** 0.010** -0.231**
(-4.18) (7.34) (7.79) (-9.97)
Log(ME) -0.001** 0.078** -0.001 0.024
(-8.69) (8.10) (-1.74) (1.34)
BE/ME -0.003* 0.192* -0.001 0.030
(-2.43) (1.97) (-0.21) (0.33)
LAG_CAR6 0.001 -0.112 0.016** -0.269**
(1.56) (-1.85) (6.24) (-3.26)
Adjusted R-square 0.002 0.0031 0.012 0.004
Number of observations 56,476 56,476 56,476 56,476
This table reports regressions on changes in hedge fund ownership and on changes in other institutional investor
ownership. The dependent variables include ΔHF_HOLD, HF_SELL, ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD, and
OTHER_INST_HOLD. ΔHF_HOLD is the change in hedge fund long positions in quarter t. HF_SELL is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if ΔHF_HOLD is negative, and it equal to zero otherwise. ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD is the
change in other institutions' positions in quarter t. OTHER_INST_SELL is an indicator variable that is equal to one if
ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD is negative, and is equal to zero otherwise. The independent variables are as follows:
BUY_CONSENSUS is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the average recommendation in quarter t is equal to or
greater than a 'Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at the end
of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at the end of a
quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. We estimate OLS
and Logit regressions. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year
correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and Petersen (2009)). The z-statistics and t-statistics are in parentheses. The
sample period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level;
**Significant at the 1% level.
Table 5
Regressions on changes in stock ownership
Dependent variables
Independent variables UPGRADE DOWNGRADE UPGRADE DOWNGRADE UPGRADE DOWNGRADE
HF_BUY 0.264** 0.170** 0.164**
(7.51) (3.24) (2.97)
OTHER_INST_BUY -0.174 -0.060 -0.100
(-1.78) (-0.67) (-1.33)
HF_SELL 0.248** 0.137** 0.134**
(4.01) (3.19) (2.93)
OTHER_INST_SELL -0.112 -0.094 -0.100
(-1.34) (-1.94) (-1.81)
Log(ME) 0.014 -0.075** 0.023 -0.061** 0.020 -0.066**
(0.93) (-4.03) (1.17) (-4.01) (1.61) (-6.03)
BE/ME 0.157 -0.086 0.218 -0.219 0.195 -0.168
(0.85) (-0.74) (1.43) (-1.08) (1.36) (-1.14)
LAG_CAR6 0.133 -0.124 0.415** -0.368 0.320 -0.287
(0.50) (-0.72) (2.63) (-1.64) (1.72) (-1.41)
VOLUME 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.22) (-0.48) (-0.44) (0.18) (-0.28) (-0.05)
ALL_STAR -0.245** -0.395**
(-6.89) (-9.10)
ALL_STAR × HF_BUY 0.114**
Dependent variables
Table 6
Regressions on recommendation revisions stratified by analyst all-star status
This table reports results from regressions on individual recommendation revisions for two sets of analysts: Institutional Investor all-star analysts and non all-star analysts.
The regressions focus on the one year period during which analysts are evaluated for the all-star status. The dependent variables are UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE.
UPGRADE is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the individual recommendation is an upgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. DOWNGRADE is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if the individual recommendation is a downgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. Logit regressions are estimated. The dependent variables are
measured starting in quarter t. The independent variables are as follows: HF_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares of a firm
held by hedge funds at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. OTHER_INST_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of
shares of a firm held by other institutions (excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_SELL and OTHER_INST_SELL are defined
analogously. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common
equity measured at the end of a quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the daily volume scaled
by shares outstanding and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. ALL_STAR is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a recommendation is
made by an all-star analyst in the Institutional Investor megazine at the given year, and is equal to zero otherwise. The regression standard errors are clustered by firm and
year to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and Petersen (2009)). The z-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period extends
from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.                    
All-star analysts Non all-star analysts All analysts
(3.28)
ALL_STAR × HF_SELL 0.120**
(3.52)
Pseudo R-Square
Number of observations 4,321 4,321 7,795 7,795 12,116 12,116
Independent variables UPGRADE DOWNGRADE
TOP_HF_BUY [A] 0.113**
(5.01)
NON_TOP_HF_BUY [B] -0.040
(-1.51)
OTHER_INST_BUY -0.086*
(-2.37)
TOP_HF_SELL [A] 0.079**
(2.77)
NON_TOP_HF_SELL [B] -0.032
(-1.42)
OTHER_INST_SELL -0.114**
(-3.98)
Log(ME) 0.022* -0.103**
(2.21) (-7.07)
BE/ME -0.002 -0.020
(-0.02) (-0.31)
LAG_CAR6 0.137 -0.129
(1.04) (-0.94)
VOLUME -0.002 0.003
(-0.86) (1.54)
Difference F-statistics ( [A] - [B] ) 12.94 7.02
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.008
Pseudo R-Square 0.001 0.006
Number of observations 56,216 56,216
Dependent variables
Table 7
Regressions on recommendation revisions stratified by hedge fund dollar turnover
This table reports results from regressions on individual analyst recommendation revisions. Two sets of regressions
are estimated. The dependent variables are UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE. UPGRADE is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if the recommendation is an upgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. DOWNGRADE is an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the recommendation is a downgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. Logit
regressions are estimated. The dependent variables are measured in quarter t. The independent variables include
the following: TOP_HF_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares of a
firm held by high dollar turnover hedge funds at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. Top dollar
turnover hedge funds are funds with dollar turnover, measured over the last quarter, that fall in the top quartile.
NON_TOP_HF_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares of a firm held
by non high dollar turnover hedge funds at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise.
OTHER_INST_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares of a firm held
by other institutions (excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise.
TOP_HF_SELL, NON_TOP_HF_SELL, and OTHER_INST_SELL are defined analogously. ME (in $ millions) is
the market value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to
market value of common equity measured at the end of a quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted
buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. The regression standard errors are clustered by firm and year to
account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and Petersen (2009)). The z-
statistics are in parentheses. The sample period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008.
*Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.                    
Independent variables UPGRADE DOWNGRADE
HF_CLIENT_BUY [A] 0.154**
(6.58)
HF_NON_CLIENT_BUY [B] 0.042
(0.87)
OTHER_INST_BUY -0.156
(-1.64)
HF_CLIENT_SELL [A] 0.151**
(4.93)
HF_NON_CLIENT_SELL [B] 0.039
(1.37)
OTHER_INST_SELL -0.297**
(-14.95)
Log(ME) 0.021 -0.072**
(1.27) (-15.41)
BE/ME 0.291 -0.045
(1.03) (-0.36)
LAG_CAR6 0.318 -0.385
(1.12) (-1.45)
VOLUME -0.001 0.003
(-0.18) (1.48)
Difference F-statistics ( [A] - [B] ) 16.79 7.06
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0079
Pseudo R-Square 0.0643 0.0574
Number of observations 8,172 8,172
Dependent variables
Table 8
Regressions on analyst recommendation revisions stratified by prime broker affiliation
This table reports results from regressions on individual analyst recommendation revisions. Two sets of regressions
are estimated. The dependent variables are UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE. UPGRADE is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if the recommendation is an upgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. DOWNGRADE is an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the recommendation is a downgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. Logit
regressions are estimated. The dependent variables are measured in quarter t. The independent variables include the
following: HF_CLIENT_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares of a
firm held by hedge funds who are prime brokerage clients of the analyst's bank at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal
to zero otherwise. HF_NON_CLIENT_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of
shares of a firm held by hedge funds who are not prime brokerage clients of the analyst's bank at quarter t-1 is
positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. OTHER_INST_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
change in the sum of shares of a firm held by other institutions (excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 is positive, and
is equal to zero otherwise. HF_CLIENT_SELL, HF_NON_CLIENT_SELL, and OTHER_INST_SELL are defined
analogously. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio
of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at the end of a quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is
six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the daily volume scaled by
shares outstanding and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. The standard errors are
clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and
Petersen (2009)). The regressions also control for prime broker fixed effects. The z-statistics derived from the
standard errors are in parentheses. The evaluation period extends from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter
of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.
Independent variables Logit regression Probit regression selection eqn regression eqn Logit regression Probit regression selection eqn regression eqn
HF_BUY 0.130** 0.081** 0.079**
(2.94) (2.92) (5.93)
OTHER_INST_BUY -0.044 -0.027 -0.028*
(-1.00) (-1.00) (-2.06)
HF_SELL 0.106* 0.066* 0.067**
(2.40) (2.40) (4.97)
OTHER_INST_SELL -0.155** -0.097** -0.095**
(-4.43) (-4.46) (-6.92)
Log(ME) 0.016 0.010 0.144** 0.026** -0.110** -0.068** 0.144** -0.042**
(1.27) (1.27) (42.97) (5.78) (-7.74) (-7.84) (42.97) (-9.35)
BE/ME -0.051 -0.031 -0.047** -0.022 -0.151 -0.094 -0.047** -0.079**
(-0.45) (-0.45) (-2.84) (-1.07) (-1.56) (-1.57) (-2.84) (-3.98)
LAG_CAR6 0.106 0.065 -0.117** 0.053* -0.114 -0.071 -0.117** -0.090**
(0.97) (0.96) (-10.91) (2.24) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-10.91) (-3.73)
VOLUME -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001
(-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.63) (0.66) (0.66) (1.10)
INDUSTRY_COVERAGE 2.757** 2.757**
(92.08) (92.08)
Number of observations 46,403 46,403 3,027,941 3,027,941 46,403 46,403 3,027,941 3,027,941
Dependent variable =UPGRADE
Heckman model
Dependent variable = DOWNGRADE
Table 9
Regressions on analyst recommendation revisions, controlling for selection bias
The Heckman (1979) selection model is used to control for selection bias in regressions on analyst recommendation revisions. Two sets of regressions are estimated. The dependent
variables are UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE. UPGRADE is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the recommendation is an upgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise.
DOWNGRADE is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the recommendation is a downgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. Logit and Probit regressions are estimated. All the
dependent variables are measured in quarter t. The independent variables include the following: HF_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares
of a firm held by hedge funds at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. OTHER_INST_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of
shares of a firm held by other institutions (excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_SELL and OTHER_INST_SELL are defined
analogously. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity
measured at the end of a quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the daily volume scaled by shares
outstanding and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. INDUSTRY_COVERAGE is the fraction of firms in the company's Fama and French (1997) industry
that analysts at the bank cover at quarter t-1. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals (Rogers (1993) and
Petersen (2009)). The z-statistics derived from the standard errors are in parentheses. In both sets of regressions, the two leftmost columns report regression results before correcting
for sample selection. The second column from the right reports results from a probit selection equation, estimated using maximum likelihood, for the probability of an analyst covering
a stock. The rightmost column reports the regression results after correcting for sample selection. The sample period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of
2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.
Heckman model
Independent variables
HF_NET_BUY 0.207** 0.195**
(5.56) (4.96)
HF_BUY 0.149**
(3.93)
HF_SHORT_BUY 0.119**
(5.36)
OTHER_INST_BUY -0.056 -0.061
(-1.34) (-1.48)
HF_NET_SELL 0.201** 0.177**
(4.71) (3.76)
HF_SELL 0.126**
(3.15)
HF_SHORT_SELL 0.134**
(5.32)
OTHER_INST_SELL -0.079 -0.081
(-1.86) (-1.93)
Log(ME) 0.018 0.017 -0.104** -0.104**
(1.61) (1.63) (-7.05) (-7.05)
BE/ME 0.054 0.055 -0.094 -0.095
(0.52) (0.54) (-1.77) (-1.78)
LAG_CAR6 0.096 0.103 -0.080 -0.086
(0.63) (0.67) (-0.50) (-0.53)
VOLUME -0.002 -0.002 0.004* 0.004*
(-1.08) (-1.13) (2.46) (2.47)
Pseudo R-Square 0.0019 0.0024 0.0023 0.0018 0.0079 0.008
Number of observations 50,689 50,689 50,689 50,689 50,689 50,689
Table 10
Regressions on analyst recommendation revisions with hedge fund short positions
This table reports results from regressions on individual analyst recommendation revisions. Two sets of regressions are
estimated. The dependent variables are UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE. UPGRADE is an indicator variable that is
equal to one if the individual recommendation is an upgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise. DOWNGRADE is an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the individual recommendation is a downgrade, and is equal to zero otherwise.
Logit regressions are estimated. All the dependent variables are measured in quarter t. The independent variables
include the following: HF_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares of a firm
held by hedge funds at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_SHORT_BUY is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if the change in the total short interest for a firm in the last month of quarter t-1 is positive,
and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_NET_BUY is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the change in the
difference between the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds at quarter t-1 and the total short interest for the firm
in the last month of quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. OTHER_INST_BUY is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if the change in the sum of shares of a firm held by other institutions (excluding hedge
funds) at quarter t-1 is positive, and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_SELL, HF_SHORT_SELL, HF_NET_SELL, and
OTHER_INST_SELL are defined analogously. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at the end of
quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at the end of a
quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is
the daily volume scaled by shares outstanding and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. The
standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals
(Rogers (1993) and Petersen (2009)). The z-statistics derived from the standard errors are in parentheses. The sample
period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant
at the 1% level.
Dependent variables
UPGRADE DOWNGRADE
